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Abstract This paper explores the safety net aspect of the labour market incentive for voca-
tional education and training (VET) in the Indian context. Using two rounds of National Sample
Survey data this paper explores the wage, unemployment, and status of employment of the in-
dividuals who participate in the labour market after completing VET. It is observed that there
is a signiﬁcant positive return of VET to the wages, and a signiﬁcant number of individuals par-
ticipate in salaried work. However, unemployment from VET is quite high, particularly for the
individuals who have done VET courses which correspond to lower levels of general education.
Institutional factors which may impact this labour market outcome are also explored for the Indian
context.
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Introduction
Compared to other developing and developed countries, par-
ticipation in formal vocational education and training (VET)
has remained quite low in India (Tilak, 2002; UNESCO, 2011).
However, there have been many developments since the
period of the 11th Plan and with the formation of the Na-
tional Skill Development Corporation (NSDC) and the Na-
tional Skill Development Agency (NSDA). The Government of
India started with the ambitious goal of fresh skilling/up-
skilling or re-skilling of 500 million by the year 2022. The Min-
istry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship was formed
in 2014 to address the overarching skilling activities in the
country.1 As per the National Skill Development Policy which
the Ministry has brought out as part of its ﬁrst policy goals
in 2015, the skilling target has been revised to 402.9 million
by 2022.2 The Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepre-
neurship aims to bring convergence among various training
programmes through implementation of “common norm” for
the programmes. As per the cabinet notiﬁcation, dated 27th
December 2013, the entire education and training system of
the country is going to adopt the National Skill Qualiﬁcation
Framework (NSQF), which is under the purview of the Na-
tional Skill Development Policy. The Ministry is working on
building a large infrastructure of training across the country
* Tel.: +91 9874088821.
E-mail address: tutana09@email.iimcal.ac.in.
1 http://www.skilldevelopment.gov.in/.
2 http://www.skilldevelopment.gov.in/assets/images/Skill%20India/
policy%20booklet-%20Final.pdf.
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through National Skill Development Corporation (NSDC) and
Director General of Training (DGT).3 Along with creating in-
frastructure, the organisations under the Ministry are working
on developing various institutional innovations for improv-
ing training programmes and their outcomes. Apart from these
initiatives from the Union Government all the states have
launched their respective State Skill Development Missions
(SSDM).
While these massive skilling activities are taking place, it
is necessary to understand whether there would be partici-
pation from students in a sustainedmanner so that the purpose
of these initiatives is served. There are examples of many large
interventions in the area of skill development, particularly
in the developing countries, which have failed (Antoninis,
2001; Foster, 1965; King & Martin, 2002). The reason for these
failures often is the lack of incentives for students to par-
ticipate in these programmes. The programmes tend to fail
if there is not enough demand for them from the students in
a sustained manner.
Why people participate in VET: the incentive
of safety net
A concept of “safety net” has been emerging, led in particu-
lar by Shavit, Arum, Muller, Ryan, and Werfhorst (Arum &
Shavit, 1995; Ryan, 2001; Shavit & Muller, 2000; Werfhorst,
2002) on the individual’s incentive for joining VET. The main
argument of the safety net concept is that individuals who
are interested in a risk averse career choice would partici-
pate in VET. A risk averse choice means low unemployment
possibility with a similar or a comparative low wage as com-
pared to the alternative career choices. It follows from this
argument that people with VET qualiﬁcation are more likely
to be in the workforce than people with corresponding general
education at upper secondary or lower secondary level as the
individuals who join VET are inclined to join the labour market
immediately even at a lower wage than the plausible future
wage of their counterparts who are continuing in the higher
education stream.
Shavit and Muller (2000) argue that vocational education
can act as a safety net since the unemployment rate is lower
for VET trained manpower than graduates from non-vocational
tracks at a comparable level. A similar argument is made by
Arum and Shavit (1995). They argue that VET reduces the prob-
ability of unemployment, and the probability of employ-
ment in lowest paying jobs. Vocational education and training
has been studied using multiple frameworks as well as in mul-
tiple contexts. However, the safety net theory is most con-
ducive to reaching a general conclusion about VET (Ryan, 2001;
Shavit & Muller, 2000; Werfhorst, 2002). The safety net theory
also argues that people in VET are likely to get a wage similar
to or lower than what people would get after higher educa-
tion. Studies which do not claim to represent the safety net
theory also take a similar stand (Kuczera, Kis, & Wurzburg,
2009). Thus, a higher chance of getting employment and a
similar or relatively lower pay than what one gets after higher
general education are considered as incentives to join VET,
according to the safety net theory. This suggests a trade-off
between choices for low-risk low-pay and high-risk high-pay
jobs.
In this article, an attempt is made to understand whether
this kind of incentive for individuals who have joined the labour
market after completion of VET exists in the Indian labour
market. It can be argued that if there is an incentive of safety
net already existing for the VET trained manpower in the
labour market in India, the success of the initiatives taken
for skilling, in terms of adequate participation, is more likely.
Moderating factor: institutional design
The extent to which VET would act as a safety net depends
upon the institutional design around VET (Iannelli & Raffe,
2007; Shavit & Muller, 1998, 2000). Some research studies show
that VET may not act as a safety net in certain contexts. For
example Korpi, Graff, Hendrickx, and Layte (2003) show that
though VET facilitates smooth transition from education to
the labour force, there is no evidence that the unemploy-
ment rate is lower for VET trained manpower vis-à-vis com-
parable general education graduates. Psacharopoulos and
Loxley (1985) in their seminal study under the patronage of
the World Bank observed that in Tanzania and Colombia,
graduates with both general education and VET take almost
equal time to ﬁnd employment (see also Tilak, 1988). Though
these studies were not conducted to address the safety net
proposition, the evidence from these studies does not bear
out the proposition of the safety net.
These ﬁndings which contradict the proposition of the
safety net can be attributed to the institutional design of the
education system, and the education and labour market re-
lation (Andersen & Werfhorst, 2010; Iannelli & Raffe, 2007;
Shavit & Muller, 1998; Werfhorst, 2011). Shavit and Muller
(1998) proposed and explained that two variables which make
a difference in the labour market outcome for the VET trained
manpower are: ﬁrst, time duration for the course and extent
of stratiﬁcation of VET from general education; and second,
occupational speciﬁcity of training and employer’s partici-
pation in it. It is to be noted that long duration of training
tends to make VET more stratiﬁed. On the other hand, high
employer participation tends to make the courses more “vo-
cational speciﬁc”.
The term stratiﬁcation refers to the extent and form of
tracking in the education system. In a system which is highly
stratiﬁed or which has long duration of training, students get
separated early in the track and their curriculum is differ-
ent from those in the general stream or other tracks, to a great
extent. Generally, when this stratiﬁcation resulting in early
curriculum differences tends to be more prominent, inter-
track mobility tends to be less likely (Nakamura, 2003; Shavit
& Muller, 1998). Employer’s participation in training tends
to create a dynamic linkage with the labour market. Indus-
try need is clearly reﬂected in the training programmes and
in the curriculum, i.e. courses become more “vocational spe-
ciﬁc”. High level of participation from the employers also
tends to decide the scale of the training programmes, based
on the market requirement. It also creates a direct place-
ment linkage between industry and training programmes.
Based on the hypothesis made by the seminal work of Shavit
and Muller (1998), a substantial amount of comparative
3 DGT is the institution which takes care of a signiﬁcant part of the
training programmes in the country and has been in existence in India
for more than 60 years.
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research has emerged (Andersen & Werfhorst, 2010; Iannelli
& Raffe, 2007; Scherer, 2005; Werfhorst, 2011). Much of this
research is in support of the hypothesis made by Shavit and
Muller (1998).
In his empirical work, Anderson & Werfhorst (2010) has ob-
served that employer’s participation in training is consid-
ered as the indicator for labour market linkage with VET. It
is also likely to make the curriculum more “occupation spe-
ciﬁc” (Anderson, 2010). Scherer (2005) observes that the
strong linkage between VET and labour market reduces un-
employment as employers have better information about the
prospective employees. Using survivor function, this study
shows that in Italy, getting the ﬁrst job is much delayed
whereas in Germany apprentices bag their ﬁrst job immedi-
ately after their training4 (Scherer, 2005). After controlling
labour market regulation effect, it is observed that the dif-
ference in the labour market outcome between these two
countries is due to vocational speciﬁcity of the courses and
high employer participation in the training. In Germany,
courses are highly vocation speciﬁc, whereas in Italy they are
not so. This extent of vocational speciﬁcity is also reﬂected
in the wages (Werfhorst, 2011). In case the education and
training system is not vocation speciﬁc, the wage earned is
explained less by acquired training and more by other factors.
Along with these factors, a third factor which can inﬂu-
ence the labour market outcome for the formal VET trained
manpower is explored, particularly keeping in mind the Indian
labour market. There is a requirement to understand the
labour market dynamics between different types of educa-
tion which might be competing for similar jobs. In the Indian
context, there is a large supply pool of engineers, which has
been observed historically (Second Education Commission
Report, 1966). It is quite likely that this large supply and con-
sequent decrease in the reservation wage may lead to a sce-
nario where engineers are preferred over the diploma or
certiﬁcate holders, thereby leading to adverse labour market
outcome for the diploma or certiﬁcate holders (Parameswaran,
1974). Thus, even if there is employer participation in train-
ing, long duration of training with “vocational speciﬁc”
courses, there is a likelihood that the labour market would
see a replacement of diploma/certiﬁcate holders by engi-
neers when the job roles are similar. This feature of the Indian
labour market is also explored.
In the next section, an attempt is made to illustrate the
VET institutional structure in India which would provide an
understanding of the impact of institutional structure on labour
market outcome. This work does not make a full-ﬂedged
attempt to link labour market outcome of VET in India with
different institutional features present in the VET system (as
that could be another research work in itself). This work
intends to explore the existing labour market incentive for
the VET trained manpower. However, the work provides some
details about the existing vocational education institutional
structure in India. It explores various possibilities of linking
the existing labour market incentives for the VET trained man-
power in India with the institutional features. This would fa-
cilitate future research work in this direction.
Vocational education and training institutions
in India
Though the literature dedicated to VET is scanty in India, ex-
isting evidence suggests that the return from formal VET is
positive (Tilak, 1988). Most of the existing studies are at micro
and plant level and are focussed on in-ﬁrm training as against
out-of-ﬁrm training. There are few studies analysing unem-
ployment and wage from the perspective of comparison
between general education and VET. In fact, until recently
there was no national level data in India based upon which
one could look into the macro picture.
The recent efforts to scale up and revamp the VET system
have begun against the background of a very poor institu-
tional context. Several studies (World Bank, 2008; ILO, 2003)
have brought out the poor institutional design for VET in India.
There were around 17 Ministries which used to conduct their
own VET in silos. There was no established industry partici-
pation mechanism in these training programmes. The most
important institution of VET in India is the Industrial Train-
ing Institute (ITI) and its disconnect with industry has been
noticeable (World Bank, 2008; ILO, 2003). As an institu-
tional innovation, under the DGT ecosystem,5 the Institute
Management Committee (IMC) was set up comprising indus-
try representatives. However, a recent report by Confedera-
tion of Indian Industries (CII, 2013) suggests that IMCs are
performing short of expectation. Under the NSDC ecosys-
tem,mechanisms such as Sector Skill Councils (SSCs) have been
set up for industry directed training programmes. Represen-
tatives from industry are chosen as the key personnel of the
SSCs and they are responsible for curriculum development,
choosing the training provider, setting up the evaluation/
questions for the students, and assessment. They are also in-
spired to take care of the placement of the students coming
out of the training. Under the DGT ecosystem, the Flexi-MoU6
concept has been introduced where different ﬁrms can adopt
ITIs and can introduce the curriculum they consider rel-
evant. Simultaneously, in this ecosystem, in order to revamp
the apprenticeship system, a new scheme called Apprentice-
ship Protsahan Yojana (APY) has been introduced where small
ﬁrms are subsidised for training apprentices.7 Also, the Ap-
prenticeship Act 1961 has been amended in order to intro-
duce many ﬂexibilities, including provision for ﬁrms to
introduce new course curriculum.8 Thus, there is a rejuve-
nated attempt to create industry connect with the training
in many forms. Also, industry involvement in curriculum de-
velopment or in assessment of the students should lead to
more vocational speciﬁcity of training over time. The courses
run by the Ministry are of two types: short term and long term.
Short term training courses are run under the NSDC ecosys-
tem whereas long term training is run by the DGT ecosys-
tem. Though DGT runs the long run training programmes, one
of its short term schemes, Skill Development Initiative, has
4 Stefani Scherer’s (2005) work also shows the effect of labour market
regulation on unemployment. However that is outside the ambit of
this present work.
5 http://www.dget.nic.in/content/innerpage/industry-
participation.php.
6 http://www.dget.nic.in/content/innerpage/ﬂexi-mou.php.
7 http://dget.nic.in/upload/54b649349d259APPRENTICE
PROTSAHANYOJANAGuidelineswithRDATaddresses.pdf.
8 http://dget.nic.in/content/innerpage/apprenticeship-training
-scheme-ats.php.
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gained popularity across India. In the short term training
courses, individuals can take a vocational course for around
three months. On the other hand, under the DGT ecosys-
tem, courses can run up to two or three years. Vocational
speciﬁcity for the short term trainings is quite low whereas
that for the long term trainings is quite high. Stratiﬁcation
is prominent for the courses under the DGT ecosystem. Also,
inter-track mobility is a challenge, particularly for the long
duration courses. There is a lack of alignment between dif-
ferent VET programmes and its hierarchies, and alignment of
VET and general education. Thus, career progression for the
candidates in VET has been uncertain (World Bank, 2008; ILO,
2003). The NSQF framework has been brought in to address
this issue of career progression. However, NSQF is still in its
early phase of implementation. The Skill University concept
is being pondered upon by the Ministry in order to facilitate
upward movement of individuals in the VET system.
In this context, this paper explores the existing incen-
tive structure for the VET manpower in the labour market.
An understanding of the incentive structure would help to
shape the dialogue on the emerging institutional setup. The
connection between the incentive structure and emerging in-
stitutional setup is explored further.
Research question
The paper probes whether the labour market outcome of
formal VET in the Indian context reﬂects a low-risk low-
payoff scenario as is observed in the emerging literature. It
further explores the new policy initiative in the context of
existing incentive structure for the VET manpower in the
labour market.
Unemployment is measured using Usual Principal status.
(This is detailed in a later section.) Apart from unemploy-
ment, wage outcome, and type of employment (i.e. sala-
ried, casual, etc.) are measured. Analysing wage outcome for
a particular group of candidates from a training/education
system is a complex undertaking as it involves an understand-
ing of several dimensions such as the existing job market sce-
nario, possibility of selection bias, quality of training
programmes etc. However, this work is focussed on exam-
ining the existing incentive structure. The reason for not ex-
amining the selection bias or impact of various trainings is
the lack of a proper instrument and detailed data about train-
ing. In this sense, it is an exploratory study.
Type of employment data is explored in order to under-
stand whether a higher proportion of manpower with formal
VET is able to join salaried employment as compared to pro-
portion of manpower from corresponding or higher level of
general education. In the Indian context, obtaining salaried
employment is considered to bemore secure and possibly more
prestigious. Desire for wage employment is very high in de-
veloping countries and it is well documented (Datta Chaudhuri,
1996; Foster, 1965; Grubb, 1995). This issue is particularly
emphasised in the literature of segmented labour market
theory. (For a detailed reading, see Harberger, 1970; De Soto,
1985; and Cain, 1976.) Types of occupation also help as a proxy
variable of employment outcome. The emerging literature on
the safety net theory analyses “occupational prestige” data.
However, in the Indian context, we only have types of em-
ployment data which could be used appropriately for this
purpose.
Methodology and data
The National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) 66th round
unit level data and 61st round unit level data are analysed
in order to understand the above phenomenon. In general,
the Employment–Unemployment survey by NSSO is con-
ducted by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Imple-
mentation (MoSPI) of India quinquennially. Schedule 10 of both
these quinquennial data deals with education and employ-
ment. In the Indian context, NSSO data is the most compre-
hensive data for studying employment and unemployment
(Himanshu, 2011) despite its various shortcomings.9
A few pointers pertinent to this study are provided at the
outset. First, the labour market outcome is obtained only for
the formal training and the study does not make any distinc-
tion between school based VET or in-ﬁrm training. As per NSSO
deﬁnition of formal training, both these categories are in-
cluded in the “formal” category and no further distinction
is made between them. (The deﬁnition of “formal” training
is provided in the appendix.) It is to be noted that in the Indian
context, the rate of return for people involved in in-ﬁrm train-
ing is, in general, better than the rate of return for people
in institutional training (Tilak, 1988). Secondly, the stan-
dard Mincerian equation is used in order to ﬁnd out the return
from education. There is scope for incorporating the use of
more sophisticated methodology in further research. Third,
the 61st round VET related data is available only for the age
group of 15 to 29. From the 66th round data, however, VET
related data is available for the age group of 15 to 59. Fourth,
there are other categories of vocational training also which
belong to informal training categories. These include the cat-
egories “hereditary”, “on the job”, “self-learning” and so on.
(Deﬁnitions of these categories are provided in the appen-
dix.) These categories are included in the ambit of analysis.
However, data on the “hereditary”, “on the job”, and “self-
learning” categories are provided in the 66th round whereas
only “hereditary” category data is provided in the 61st round.
We take these categories as provided by NSSO.
Observation from NSSO data
In general “safety net” is concerned with the measurement
of wage, unemployment, and occupational prestige. In this
work, the variables taken are unemployment rate, current
weekly wage, and proportion of salaried employment in the
total work force. With low unemployment rate, similar or low
current weekly wage, and a high proportion of salaried
employment—this being higher for VET trained manpower as
against comparable general education graduates, then it is
considered that VET in India is working as a safety net. (Table 1
provides the descriptive statistics for wage employment.)
9 To look at the various shortcomings of these data so far as
employment/unemployment is concerned, see Himanshu (2011).
Incentive for VET in Indian labour market 101
Unemployment
There are four ways of measurement used by NSSO for mea-
suring employment and unemployment. They are, namely,
usual principal status (PS), usual principal and subsidiary status
(UPSS), current weekly status (CWS), and current daily status
(CDS). Of these measures, PS is a measure of unemploy-
ment that reﬂects those who are in the labour force but not
working in the majority period (more than 180 days) of the
year. Once the broad usual principal activity status is deter-
mined, usual subsidiary activity is determined if a person is
engaged in some activity for a minor period of time in the
year (no less than 30 days in a year). Further, NSSO deﬁnes
UPSS as a summation of principal and subsidiary status to-
gether. A person may work only in subsidiary status or prin-
cipal status or in both, and is considered as engaged in usual
status economic activity. Thus, “usual status” in this sense
is a relaxed deﬁnition of employment. For this reason, only
PS is considered in this paper. The employment and unem-
ployment descriptions provided are proportions obtained from
multiplier adjusted absolute ﬁgures (see Tables 2 and 3).
It is seen, from Tables 2 and 3, that unemployment among
the formal VET trained manpower is tremendously high vis-
à-vis others. This is true for both PS and UPSS. This is even
more signiﬁcant considering the way unemployment is mea-
sured in India, as the deﬁnition of unemployment is quite
relaxed in India (Sen, 1976). The high level of unemploy-
ment for this category is consistent in both 61st and 66th level
NSSO data. There is a slight decline in unemployment in the
66th round over the 61st round for formal VET. This can be
considered as a reﬂection of overall decline in unemploy-
ment in the 66th round over the 61st round. Thus, it appears
that the incentive for low unemployment for the VET trained
manpower in the labour market is not reﬂected in the labour
market of India. Instead of low risk, it appears that a high
risk component due to unemployment is associated with the
VET trained manpower in India.10
Several studies denote the unemployment problem among
VET trained people in India (World Bank, 2008; ILO, 2003).
Figs. 1 and 2 are representatives of the unemployment com-
parison between various levels of education and correspond-
ing VET. The vertical axis represents percentage of
unemployment according to PS. The horizontal axis repre-
sents levels of general education. The unemployment ﬁgures
are obtained for VET with certain level of general education
10 Looking at the ﬁgures of unemployment as obtained from various
NSSO data so far as principal status is concerned, unemployment was
never more than 5.4% (for rural males in 64th round) in different
rounds and for different categories until the 66th round (Himanshu,
2011). For UPSS category, highest unemployment is observed in 64th
round rural male category with 4.6% unemployment.
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics (for wage employment).
66th round NSSO data
(from 15 to 59 year)
66th round NSSO data
(from 15 to 29 year)
61st round NSSO data
(from 15 to 29 year)
No. of observations 71658 22872 29979
Female (% of total) 48.6 48.3 49.2
Wage 1511 (1882.8) 1099 (1474) 928.5 (1087.4)
Maximum wage 69000 69000 26920
Minimum wage 0 0 0
Rural (% of total) 61.2 61.2 66.6
Age 33.2 (12.1) 21.5 (4.3) 21.7 (4.2)
General education (for students above class VIII) 10.6 (2.6) 10.4 (2.4) 9.9 (2.3)
Experience 15 (11.5) 5.8 (4.2) 7.2 (4.3)
Maximum experience 46 16 16
Minimum experience 0 0 0
Formal VET in the age group with graduate education and
above (% of all in the education group)
2.54 3.25 3.66
Formal VET in the age group with secondary and below
graduate education (% of all in the education group)
.32 .43 .47
Table 2 Employment status (as a percentage of labour force) using usual principal status as per 61st round NSS.
Self-employment Salaried employment Casual Unemployment
Formal VET 30.3 54.7 5.8 9.3
Hereditary 83.2 5.1 11.3 0.4
Self-learning 63.1 19.6 15.8 1.5
On the job 40.8 36.3 22.3 0.5
Other 55.1 26.5 13.6 4.8
Non-VET 49.2 24.5 22.0 4.2
Total 49.6 25.7 20.7 4.1
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and for corresponding general education without VET. For 61st
round, these ﬁgures are obtained only from the 15–29 years
of age group whereas for 66th round, these ﬁgures are ob-
tained for the 15–59 years of age group.
It can be observed from the ﬁgures that the unemploy-
ment from VET is very high particularly for those who join
VET after completing a comparatively lower level of educa-
tion as compared to the individuals who have completed only
corresponding level of general education but with no VET. At
the higher level of education—namely graduate and post
graduate level—unemployment from VET is almost similar to
that from general education at this level.
Type of work
Principal activity status is considered while looking at dif-
ferent types of employment. Self-employment, salaried em-
ployment, casual public work, and casual private work are
the various categories of employment. As mentioned earlier,
type of employment is important here since in a way it rep-
resents levels of occupational security and prestige. Foster
(1965) in his seminal study on vocational school fallacy shows
that students do not want to get skill training for being self-
employed. To be self-employed, formal skill training or cer-
tiﬁcation is neither a choice for the students nor is it required
in the market in the Indian context. Looking at the trade union
literature, it is employment security which is historically
valued in the Indian labour market (Datta Chaudhuri, 1996).
Among other concerns of the trade unions, it is employ-
ment security which is one of the most important issues. Also,
in India a lion’s share (93%) of the labour market is taken up
by the informal sector, and the informal sector does not have
the mechanism to recognise certiﬁcates and neither does it
require certiﬁed trained people. Thus, it can be assumed that
the main purpose of formal VET is to provide salaried and more
secure employment.
It can be observed from Tables 2 and 3 that formally re-
ceived VET category has the highest proportion of salaried
employment among all other categories. This is consistent over
both the rounds. In fact, there is a growth of salaried em-
ployment for formally received category VET in the 66th round
over the 61st round of NSSO data. This is a positive growth
so far as outcome of formal VET is concerned.
Wage
For the 66th round of NSSO data, two wage regressions are
carried out. First regression is done taking the age group 15
to 59 years. Second regression is done taking the age group
15 to 29 years. The reason for taking the 15 to 29 year age
group separately is for the purpose of comparison. In the 61st
round, data are collected only up to 29 years for vocational
education and training.
Selection of variables and ﬁlters
Income data are provided in NSSO only for wage or salaried
employed people and not for the self-employed. Hence all
other categories for which income data are not available are
ﬁltered out.
Table 3 Employment status (as a percentage of labour force) using usual principal status as per 66th round NSS.
Self-employment Salaried employment Casual employment Unemployment
Formal received 24.7 56.4 5.7 13.2
Hereditary 74.7 5.1 19.7 0.5
Self-learning 58.5 15.5 24.8 1.1
On the job 35.0 37.3 26.6 1.1
Other 57.6 25.1 13.4 3.9
non-VET 45.9 15.9 35.7 2.5
Total 46.1 17.3 34.0 2.6
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Figure 1 Unemployment and education (61st round NSSO data):
15 to 29 year age group.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f u
ne
m
pl
oy
ed
 (P
S)
Last Level of general education
Unemployment VET
Unemployment Gen Edu
Figure 2 Unemployment and education (66thround NSSO data):
15 to 59 year age group.
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Generally, experience and experience square terms are
used in the standard Mincerian wage equation. Normally, ex-
perience variable is deﬁned as Experience = Age—5 years in
general education. However, in the NSSO survey, the exact
years of general education are not provided; instead levels
of education (e.g. primary, secondary, etc.) are provided. Con-
sequently, there could be a problem of many approximations—
namely approximation of years of education, of experience,
term, and so on. Hence age and square of age can be used
in the regression equation as experience is a linear mono-
tonic transformation of age. Many works based on NSSO data
have used age instead of experience (Bhaumik & Chakrabarty,
2009; Dutta, 2006). In this work, age is used as a proxy of
experience.
Among the independent variables, age, years of general
education, dummy variables for formal vocational training,
location, gender, and family based enterprises are in-
cluded. Since the prime concern is to see the effect of VET,
dummy variable for vocational training is included. In the
dummy of VET, we have taken two values. For formal re-
ceived VET dummy variable = 1 is taken. For no vocational
training, dummy variable takes a value of 0. Dummy vari-
able for location (rural and urban) and gender are also used.
Another dummy is introduced in order to capture the effect
of the enterprise size. Family based enterprise dummy is in-
troduced for this as enterprise size = 1 if it is family based
and 0 otherwise. Thus, for the smaller enterprise sizes, the
dummy takes a value of 1 whereas for the larger one, it takes
a value of 0. Logarithm of wage is used as dependent vari-
able. Also, gender is included in the set of independent
variables.
Interesting results can be observed if comparison of wage
return for people with/without vocational training is made
in the two rounds of data (Table 4).
Regression result for 61st round suggests that age and
general education are signiﬁcant at 1% level of signiﬁcance.
Interestingly, vocational training has signiﬁcant effect on
wage. At the same time, for 66th round, both general edu-
cation and age are signiﬁcant at 1% level of signiﬁcance.
Similar to 61st round, it shows that effect of vocational edu-
cation is signiﬁcant at 1% level of signiﬁcance. With this ob-
servation, it can be argued that effect of formal VET on wage
is positive. Other variables, as already mentioned, i.e. loca-
tion and gender, have signiﬁcant impact on both the rounds
on wage. In both the regressions it can be observed that lo-
cation and gender variables signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the wage.
Males get an advantage over females in the labour market.
There is a signiﬁcant advantage in wage for the participants
who live in the urban area over their counterparts in the rural
area. It is discernible that in all cases enterprise type vari-
able is signiﬁcantly negative. It indicates that wage is sig-
niﬁcantly low for smaller enterprises when compared with
larger enterprises. Constant term is positive and is also sig-
niﬁcant for both the rounds.
Thus, general education, experience (age proxy), and lo-
cation all behave in an expected manner in both the rounds.
Dummy for the formal VET also has a positive signiﬁcant impact
on wage in all the rounds of data. These labour market out-
comes are explained below in the Indian labour market
context.
Explaining the Indian context
The effect of VET on wage, as discerned from both the rounds
of NSSO data, is positive. Importantly, however, a high level
of unemployment is associated with those trained in formal
VET. Vocational education and training provides a higher per-
centage of salaried employment, and a better wage vis-à-
vis general education. It has been observed that only the
manpower trained in VET corresponding to a higher level of
education has similar unemployment rate as compared to un-
employment for the manpower in the labour market which
is from corresponding general education. It appears that VET
trained manpower in the labour market has an advantage over
the corresponding general education trained manpower.
However, so far as unemployment is concerned, safety net
Table 4 Return from general and formal vocational education.
Dep. variable: log wage 66th round of NSSO data
(up to 59 yr.)
66th round of NSSO data
(up to 29 yr.)
61st round of NSSO data
(up to 29 yr.)
Age 0.04 (24.20)** 0.06 (4.07)** 0.075 (6.30)**
Age sq. −0.001 (10.73)** −0.001 (1.4) −0.001 (2.6)**
General education 0.09 (169.27)** 0.058 (58.60)** 0.078 (62.43)**
Formal vocational 0.151 (8.58)** 0.184 (6.71)** 0.172 (8.5)**
Hereditary −0.145 (5.41)** −0.058 (1.32) −0.17(−7.9)
Self-learning 0.033 (1.43) .06 (1.5) -
On the job 0.05 (3.40)** 0.018 (0.85) -
Other 0.025 (-0.66) .07 (1.1) −0.003 (1.8)
Female −0.453 (67.57)** −0.358 (31.10)** −0.41 (41.2)**
Region 0.251 (44.65)** 0.234 (24.65)** 0.25 (29.25)**
Family based enterprise −0.177 (29.70)** −0.057 (5.93)** −0.38 (24.6)**
Constant term 5.4 (177.26)** 5.1 (31.09)** 4.17 (31.8)**
Adjusted R square 0.47 0.29 0.31
No. of observation 68,661 21,911 29,194
**p < .01; *p < .05.
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proposition holds its ground only for the individuals with a
high level of general education.
As argued above, the reasons for the high unemployment
among the VETs could be explained through the two institu-
tional designs speciﬁcally mentioned in the safety net theory
and one additional factor included by author in this discussion.
This situation of high unemployment for VET in India needs
to be explored. There can be three reasons for it. First, it
could be the extent of stratiﬁcation of courses and duration
of training. Second, it could be due to the “vocational speci-
ﬁcity” of the courses and employer participation. Third, it
could be due to the external labour market condition par-
ticularly where engineering degree holders and VET trained
manpower have similar job roles.
Extent of stratiﬁcation and course duration
As mentioned earlier, the extent of stratiﬁcation for various
VET courses in India varies signiﬁcantly. The NSDC ecosys-
tem courses tend to be of short duration whereas DGT eco-
system courses are of long duration. The NSS data used in this
paper does not distinguish different kinds of training based
on the ecosystem they belong to. However, the data provide
duration of various VET courses. We plotted Table 5 to see
the extent of unemployment with different duration of train-
ings. However, we observe that for both 66th and 61st round
data, there is no linear relationship between duration of train-
ing and the extent of unemployment as could be envisaged
from the safety net proposition. Possibly we need to con-
sider other factors which lead to unemployment as well in
this context to understand to what extent the course dura-
tion is leading to unemployment.
Employer participation and vocational speciﬁcity
As discussed earlier, various mechanisms for employer par-
ticipation in the training space are emerging. A few of the
mechanisms of employer participation in training are through
IMC, SSC, or through Flexi MoU, adoption of training centres,
creating centres of excellence, and so on. These mecha-
nisms are still in the process of emerging and would take time
to crystallise. However, there is a signiﬁcant difference in
these various mechanisms with remarkable differences in the
extent and mode of employer participation in training. In the
IMCs, in their present form, employer participation is re-
stricted to meetings at certain intervals about the function-
ing of the ITI; however, in case of Flexi-MoU the employer
has more responsibility in terms of creating training curricu-
lum, training of the candidate, and counselling for place-
ment. On the other hand, employer participation in the SSCs
is for vetting the curriculum developed by the SSCs, and pro-
viding inputs from industry for the concerned SSC on various
other matters. Centre of excellence is being envisaged as a
training centre which would be owned by a different indus-
try. Thus, these different mechanisms for industry partici-
pation and curriculum development can lead to different types
of labour market outcome. It is also possible that different
modes and extents of industry participation could be quan-
tiﬁed and used to understand the labour market outcome.
Also, the “vocational speciﬁcity” for the courses would vary
from course to course and there is a likelihood that a higher
education background can fetch a better premium. There is a
clear shift globally as well as in India (Ahmed & Chattopadhyay,
2016; Duraisamy, 2002) towards a premium on higher educa-
tion. Changing skill sets across countries now require more of
higher general education than very speciﬁc niche technical edu-
cation (Lloyd & Payne, 2002). This is even true for Germany
(Culpepper, 1999; Thelen, 2004) which is famous for its sophis-
ticated technical training. It is observed that on an average,
educational requirement is higher in the services sector than
the rest of the economy in the Indian context (Bhattacharjee
& D’Souza, 2013). On an average, year of schooling is 68% higher
in services sector than for the economy as a whole
(Bhattacharjee & D’Souza, 2013). New occupations such as ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries or in real estate, retail, banking and
ﬁnance, certain IT related courses, administration and social
service related courses require higher levels of general edu-
cation. The general education background of the participants
in these trades would reveal that they have a higher level of
general education as compared to others in other different
trades (Ahmed, 2016). Thus, vocational speciﬁcity should be
clearly deﬁned for these courses and higher education compo-
nent should be taken into account.
Labour market structure: top heavy structure of
engineers over VET
There has always been a trend towards “over-supply” of the
“over educated”, i.e. engineering degree holders in the Indian
labour market and thereby the lowering of the reservation
wage (Blaug, Layard, & Woodhall, 1969).
Blaug et al. (1969) have shown that highly educated labour
is used in jobs which do not require that level of education
(also in Prasad, 1979). Though occasionally there has been
emphasis on VET (Nayar, 1970; Zachariah, 1970), for various
reasons, VET has not received the required importance in
India (Nayar, 1970; Zachariah, 1970). Further, it has been
Table 5 Duration of training and unemployment.
Training duration 61st round (15 to
29 years of age)
66th round (15 to
59 years of age)
66th round (15 to
29 years of age)
Up to 3 months 24.3 9.15 18.7
3 months to 6 months 32.6 14.8 24.6
6 months to 1 year 31.9 16.1 30.3
1 year to 2 years 18.5 12.6 27.3
More than 2 years 33.1 10.8 24.4
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observed historically that there is very high unemployment
among the VET trainedmanpower (Parameswaran, 1974). Also,
the jobs which VET trained people do are often discon-
nected from the training they received (World Bank, 2008).
Different government reports have pointed out the anoma-
lies of engineering related manpower proﬁle in India. For
example, the Second Education Commission (1966, p. 687)
observes that manpower from engineering and related trades
in India is top heavy in comparison with other countries. While
in all developed countries a particular thumb rule regarding
ratio of manpower has come into existence (Second Educa-
tion Commission, 1966), India shows a reverse ratio. In de-
veloped countries the manpower has a pyramidal shape with
a small number of engineers at the top and a large number
of technicians/workers at the bottom. However in India, the
situation is more like an inverted pyramid with more number
of engineers on the top and comparatively less number of
technicians/diplomas at the bottom. Similar observations have
been made by the Meghnad Saha Committee, and the Zakir
Hussain Committee as well (Second Education Commission,
1966). The Institute of Applied Manpower Research data (IAMR,
2009; IAMR, 2007) also reﬂects this trend in recent times.
With this manpower proﬁle there is a possibility that en-
gineers would encroach upon the jobs of those trained in poly-
technics, ITI and other vocationally trained manpower. It has
been observed that unemployment among diploma holders
is more acute than unemployment among degree holders, and
unemployment among ITI/Industrial Training Centre (ITC)
trained manpower is more acute than unemployment among
diploma holders (Parameswaran, 1974) (Figs. 3 and 4). A look
at the present unemployment statistics will further conﬁrm
this scenario.
It can be discerned (from Tables 6 and 7) that there is a
high level of unemployment for polytechnics/diploma holders
as compared to engineers and ITI trained manpower. It is quite
plausible that with the growth of a large number of private
engineering colleges in this country and the corresponding
growth of engineers, the polytechnics are ﬁnding it difﬁcult
to get opportunities in the job market. The ITI trained workers
seem to be less vulnerable as compared to the polytechnic/
diploma trained workforce due to the difference in the job
roles offered to and performed by the manpower from ITIs
and polytechnics. However, further research can bring out
the dynamic relationship between the manpower in the labour
market from ITIs, polytechnics and engineers.
Research suggests that while the Indian manufacturing
sector continued to stagnate, the sector witnessed high
mechanisation in the post liberalisation period (Chaudhuri,
2002; Kannan & Raveendran, 2008; Nagraj, 2004; Unni & Rani,
2004). This has led to fewer shop ﬂoor employments, whereas
employment for engineers continued to grow (Nagraj, 2004).
At the same time, the growth of contractual labour force might
have a negative impact on the labour market outcome of the
manpower out of VET. Unlike the earlier scenario, big ﬁrms
are persistently introducing capital intensity across all manu-
facturing industries. The Industrial Dispute act, clause 5B stipu-
lates that ﬁrms with a manpower size of 100 or above cannot
ﬁre a worker without the permission of the government,
whereas they could do so for managers. This has resulted, in
recent times, in ﬁrms recruiting fewer shop ﬂoor workers on
their payroll. This can have a direct implication on the VET
trained manpower. The above description holds good for the
organised manufacturing sector.
There is also a vast unorganised manufacturing sector that
drives the Indian manufacturing industry. However, the labour
market for engineers, diploma holders, and technicians is
mainly in the organised manufacturing sector.
In post liberalisation India, the information technology (IT)
industry has been a major driving force in the Indian service
industry (Arora & Athreye, 2002). This has resulted in the
growth of IT training both in formal engineering colleges as
well as in the domain of VET. There has been a huge growth
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Table 6 Principal status: 61st round NSSO data, 15 to
29 years.
61st round NSSO data ITI Polytechnic Engineering
Employed 79.13 72.93 81.56
Unemployed 20.86 27.07 18.44
Table 7 Principal status: 66th round NSSO data, 15 to
29 years.
66th round NSSO data ITI Polytechnic Engineer
Employed 82.65 78.51 83.45
Unemployed 17.35 21.51 16.54
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of private engineering colleges in this period. This growth has
been primarily driven by the demand from the IT industry
(Fuller & Narasimhan, 2006). The growth story can be traced
by looking at the recent engineering colleges and the courses
that they offer.11 The consequence of this growth can be ob-
served in daily newspaper reports.12 With the tremendous
growth in the supply side, a large number students remain
unemployed and, as a consequence, a large number of seats
in the engineering colleges remain vacant. This indicates a
situation of oversupply of IT related manpower in India.
Looking at the two rounds of NSSO data, it can be ob-
served that it is the IT related VET trained people who face
the most adverse labour market consequences. In both rounds
of data, over 50% of the IT related VET trained manpower
report that they have not beneﬁtted from the training they
received. They form the highest number of non-beneﬁciaries
among all types of VET. Table 8 shows the result obtained from
the 66th round of NSSO data on the beneﬁts obtained from
the different trainings.
It is possible that oversupply of engineers in IT related
courses causes poor labour market situation for the IT related
VET courses. It is also likely that similar to IT courses in
engineering, there are too many VET training centres with
IT related courses being opened up. In fact, in both the rounds
of NSSO data, it is observed that it is IT which has most number
of students among all the VET courses.
The World Bank (2015) has conducted an evaluation study
of ﬁve short term training schemes which includes Skill De-
velopment Initiative Scheme run by DGT, NSDC run short
term training, short term training programmes such as
Aajeevika scheme, the Rural Self Employment Training In-
stitutes (RSETI) scheme run by Ministry of Rural Development,
and the Step-Up programme run by Ministry of Housing and
Urban Poverty Alleviation. This study is conducted in ﬁve
states namely Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Orissa, Rajasthan
and Madhya Pradesh. It has been observed that the employ-
ment rate from the programme is quite modest at around
27% overall for all the programmes. Though there are varia-
tions across the different trades and different states in the
placement rates, it is never higher than 36% (Table 9). The
young age of the recipients is also considered and in this
study candidates who have been working for two years after
having graduated from the training programme have been
traced. It has been observed that even after two years of
training, the employment rate is 28%. This study also ob-
serves that even though the students are placed after the
training in different jobs, they do not necessarily continue
in those jobs for a very long time. In fact, the rate of
quitting is quite high. It indicates that though initial place-
ment ensures insertion in the labour market, it by no means
ensures a good job match or sustainability of employment
(World Bank, 2015). This study also indicates that almost
30% of the recipients of the training indicate that they do
not want to join the labour market immediately after train-
ing. Rather, they want to pursue higher education after the
completion of their training.
11 (http://wbut.ac.in/datas/users/0-college-list.pdf, http://
wbut.ac.in/datas/users/0-college%20list-2012-13-23-07-12.pdf): In-
dicates the growth of engineering colleges in West Bengal. (http://
wbut.ac.in/datas/users/0-placement_11.pdf): suggests that most of
the recruiting companies are software ﬁrms.
12 A. http://www.telegraphindia.com/1120909/jsp/7days/story
_15955325.jsp#.Uf1F9NKmiME, B. http://articles.timesoﬁndia
.indiatimes.com/2012-09-16/hyderabad/33879470_1_colleges
-face-closure-admissions-lakh-students C. http://articles.timesoﬁndia
.indiatimes.com/2013-08-02/coimbatore/41005482_1_vacant
-seats-aicte-colleges.
Table 8 Beneﬁt obtained from different trainings: 66th round of NSSO data.
Field of training codes Self-employment Wage employment Not beneﬁtted
Mechanical 10.35 56.06 33.59
Electrical 23.27 45.71 31.02
Computer 7.07 32.55 60.38
Civil 19.58 58.2 22.22
Chemical 13.04 65.22 21.74
Leather 14.29 71.43 14.29
Textile 32.58 9.63 57.79
Catering, nutrition, hotels 5.13 61.54 33.33
Artisan 33.33 17.65 49.02
Creative arts 29.55 31.82 38.64
Agriculture 23.53 35.29 41.18
Non-crop based agriculture 9.52 28.57 61.9
Health and paramedical 21.35 58.47 20.19
Ofﬁce and business related 8.81 41.41 49.78
Driving and motor mechanic 31.03 46.55 22.41
Beautician 37.5 8.82 53.68
Travel 10 50 40
Photography 63.64 9.09 27.27
Childcare, nutrition, pre-schools 1.69 66.95 31.36
Journalism, mass communication 21.43 57.14 21.43
Printing technology 14.71 50 35.29
Other 14.09 47.82 38.09
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Conclusion and further research
Thus, it is observed that VET is fetching a good wage premium
whereas unemployment is quite high for the VET trained man-
power. Also, after their VET course, individuals are more likely
to join the salaried sector employment which is what is desired
in the Indian context. Vocational education and training could
bring labour market beneﬁt for the individuals. However,
rampant growth of VET may also lead to high unemploy-
ment. Appropriate labour market coordination is an abso-
lute necessity in the Indian context. A measured growth of
VET along with various innovative ways of industry partici-
pation into training could lead to desired labour market
outcome and it can thereby increase the value of the train-
ing for the individuals.
There are several issues that bear further probing, which
could not be addressed in this research. First, we need to un-
derstand further the nature of unemployment that affect in-
dividuals. Often, youth unemployment could be a reasonwhich
may inﬂate the unemployment ﬁgure. Also, the unemploy-
ment in developing and developed countries could be quite
different (Ahmed, forthcoming). Second, we need to look into
the various factorswhich are responsible for the labourmarket
outcome for the VET manpower and which are speciﬁed in
the literature. The extent of employer engagement, the extent
of vocational speciﬁcity of the courses, duration of training
and extent of stratiﬁcation variable could be used to under-
stand their effect on the labourmarket outcome for VET. Third,
research is needed to be conducted about the competition
betweenengineers, diplomaholders and ITI certiﬁcateholders/
technicians in the labourmarket. The pressure of huge supply
of engineers in India and a corresponding decline of the res-
ervation wage for them may lead to a decline of reservation
wage and employers may prefer an engineer over a diploma
holder or certiﬁcate holder unless the job role is speciﬁc for
a diploma holder or a certiﬁcate holder. Fourth, we should
conduct this analysis by considering different types of VET sepa-
rately. Each of these VET courses is different in terms of du-
ration, extent of stratiﬁcation, vocational speciﬁcity andhigher
education component, and labourmarket orientation. Though
in this work, an attempt is made to classify polytechnic/
diploma, ITI/ technicians, this could be pared further.
Appendix
Deﬁnition of different types of vocational trainings: (as pro-
vided in the source of data)
Formal vocational training: Vocational training that took
place in education and training institutions which fol-
lowed a structured training programme and led to cer-
tiﬁcates, diplomas or degrees, recognised by State/
Central Government, Public Sector and other reputed
concerns was considered as formal vocational training. By
structured training programme, it was meant that (i) the
training programme had a deﬁnite title with prescribed syl-
labus and curriculum and a speciﬁed duration of the train-
ing, and (ii) the training had some entry level eligibility
in terms of education and age.
Hereditary training: The expertise in a vocation or trade
is sometimes acquired by the succeeding generations from
other members of the household, generally the elders,
through gradual exposure to such works as are involved in
carrying out their ancestral profession. The expertise gained
through signiﬁcant hands-on experience enables the in-
dividual to take up activities in self-employment capac-
ity or makes him employable. These were considered as
non-formal vocational training acquired through heredi-
tary sources.
On the job training: The expertise acquired by a person
while in employment (current and/or past), either through
informal training by the employer or organisation or through
the exposure to the type of job that he/she was perform-
ing, was considered non-formal vocational training through
learning on the job.
Other: “Other” sources included cases where the exper-
tise for a vocation or trade was developed even from the
household members, provided that the said vocation or
trade was different from the one relating to their ances-
tral trade or vocation.
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